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Gender Disparities in Self-employment in Urban China’s Market Transition: 
Income Inequality, Occupational Segregation, and Mobility Processes 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the first quantitative analysis of gender disparities in self-
employment in urban China. It documents the extent of gender income inequality in self-
employment. By disaggregating self-employment into three occupational classes, it shows the 
gender segregation within self-employment—women were concentrated in the financially least 
rewarding segment—and identifies it as a main source of the gender income inequality. It 
examines a range of determinants of participation in self-employment—family structure, family 
background, and career history—and how their gender-specific effects contributed to gender 
segregation. Although using data from a 1996 national survey, this study captures two key 
processes that shaped the structure of self-employment in contemporary urban China: the 
restructuring of the state sector and the growth of financial returns and social status in private 
sector, both of which contributed to the formation of gender segregation in self-employment.  
 
 
  2
In China’s transition to a market economy, the rapidly growing private sector created a 
new space for employment and for creating inequality. Many studies examined gender disparities 
emerged in this sector and found that, despite offering more opportunities of financial wealth, the 
growing market sector was highly gender-segregated, had a greater degree of gender inequality, 
exposed women to even greater disadvantages and intensified work-family conflicts than the 
state sector. Women were squeezed out of jobs with faster wage growth, sorted into low-wage 
and feminized manufacturing and service jobs, less likely to work in high-paying foreign firms, 
and suffered wage discrimination in private firms.1  
The growing literature on gender disparities in China’s private sector, however, has so far 
left out one key segment—self-employment. Self-employment presents a unique setting where 
both the institutions regulating gender roles in the workplace and family and the individual 
strategies in making employment choice can differ from those in wage employment, creating 
distinctive patterns of gender inequalities. Two differences are particularly salient. First, in wage 
employment, employers’ discrimination of women and under-valuing of female labour are key 
causes of gender disparities in income and career advancement; but both are absent in self-
employment. Second, the frequent fusion of family and work in self-employment allows family 
norms, especially the traditional family corporatism and patriarchal authority that have been 
revitalized in contemporary China,2 to become the dominant force in shaping gender roles and 
forming gender inequality. In private-sector wage employment in urban China, even though the 
state played a much smaller role than in the state sector, it still acted to counter the influence of 
traditional family norms.  
The creation of gender disparities in self-employment, however, is also closely related 
with gender inequality in wage employment. Studies in developed countries have found that the 
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autonomy and flexibility of self-employment allows a better balance between work and family. 
This, and the absence of employer discrimination, can make self-employment a particularly 
appealing choice to women by providing an escape from both work-family conflicts and gender-
related disadvantages in wage employment. We may therefore expect that, given the greater 
extent of gender disparities in China’s private-sector wage employment, this pattern of women’s 
selective entry into self-employment can be even more pronounced.  
All these suggest that gender disparities in self-employment in urban China not only 
require a separate analysis and cannot be inferred from findings about private-sector wage 
employment, an analysis of these will also provide new understandings of the dynamics that 
shape gender inequality in China’s new employment structure. The goals of this study are 
therefore to fill this gap in the literature on gender disparities in China’s private sector, provide 
the first systematic examination of the extent of gender disparities in self-employment during 
urban China’s market transition, and attempt a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of 
men and women’s different participation in self-employment.  
Self-employment in urban China experienced rapid growth after the reform started in 
1978. The number of getihu (个体户, individual industrial-commercial households) in Chinese 
cities grew from 0.15 million nation-wide in 1978 to 36.1 million in 2008, a 240-fold increase 
over three decades; its share in the urban labour force also grew from 0.2 per cent to 11.9 per 
cent during the same period.3 Since the mid-1990s, self-employment has constituted around 10 
percent of the total employment in urban China. The initial re-emergence of self-employment 
and entrepreneurial activities in China attracted wide attention among China scholars and was 
examined in a series of studies.4 All these studies were based on qualitative data collected in a 
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single or a few locales; their focus was usually on private enterprises, which in earlier years of 
the reform were usually just getihu and too small to be distinguished from self-employment. 
Many of these studies already noticed the gender disparities that were emerging in self-
employment—in particular, women’s concentration in low-end self-employment activities such 
as street peddling and men’s dominant roles in family businesses.5 These findings suggest that, if 
this pattern would continue as self-employment expanded into more occupations that offered 
diverging economic returns and social statuses, strong gender segregation among different types 
of self-employment and significant gender income inequality would emerge. Such outcomes 
would contradict the expectation that women enter self-employment to escape from gender 
discrimination and inequality in wage employment; they also raise the question that, without 
employer discrimination, what could have caused the gender disparities in self-employment.  
Surprisingly, despite its continued growth, the issue of self-employment in urban China 
largely disappeared from the literature in the past decade. An extensive literature search only 
yielded one published article on self-employment in urban China, which actually focused on 
cadres’ responses to market opportunities rather than the internal character and composition of 
self-employment.6 The early observations on gender disparities in self-employment from 
qualitative studies still wait to be tested on a larger scale and with representative data.  
In addition to quantitatively analyzing national data, this study makes a key improvement 
on past research on self-employment in urban China. Borrowing from the new scholarship on 
self-employment in developed countries that emphasizes the heterogeneity within self-
employment,7 I disaggregate self-employment in urban China into three occupational classes –
unskilled individually self-employed (UISE), skilled and professional individual self-employed 
(SISE) and small employers. A disaggregated approach that identifies heterogeneous positions 
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within self-employment that present different rewards and opportunities to people helps to clarify 
confusions in previous studies about whether entry into self-employment represented upward 
mobility and all the “entrepreneurs” in this sector were necessarily winners of the transition. 
More importantly, it allows us to investigate how gender gap in earnings was related to 
occupational gender segregation within self-employment, an issue not studied in past research.  
 
Self-Employment in Urban China in the 1990s  
Data used in this study come from the Life History and Social Change in Contemporary 
China (LHSC) survey conducted in 1996, which used multi-stage stratified random sampling to 
generate a nationally representative sample of 6,090 adults (aged 20-69) from all regions of 
China except Tibet.8 Since its collection, this dataset has become one of the most widely used in 
sociological studies of contemporary China and has appeared in numerous publications.9 Besides 
being nationally representative, what makes this dataset especially valuable is that the survey 
collected retrospective data on the complete educational and occupational histories of the 
respondents. Till this day, among the publically available national datasets, the rich longitudinal 
data in this dataset remain unsurpassed. 
Using this dated dataset, however, also raises a concern. Besides getting a snapshot of the 
status of self-employment in urban China in the mid-1990s and clarifying earlier findings on this 
important part of China’s recent history of market transition, by analyzing this dataset, can we 
also identify any trends that have continued since then and helped to shape gender disparities in 
self-employment in today’s China? I argue that, by the time of the data collection, two key 
changes that shaped both the occupational structure and gender segregation in self-employment 
in urban China had already started. First, most of the ideological and political obstacles and 
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disincentives that might have hindered people’s entry into self-employment had been removed 
by 1996.10 Two more boosts to the private sector would come later—the incorporation of Jiang 
Zemin’s “Three Represents” in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution in 2002 and 
the constitutional amendment to codify the protection of private property in 2004. These two, 
however, were more about recognizing the growing power of the new propertied classes than 
providing additional incentives for the growth of the private sector.11 Parallel to the elevation of 
social and political statuses of the private sector, by the mid-1990s, growth of the market 
economy had also allowed some self-employment activities to offer opportunities for upward 
mobility and financial wealth that were unattainable even in the state sector and to become a 
more appealing career choice to people with greater human and political capital.12 More well-
qualified urban Chinese started “jumping into the sea” to open their own businesses, and greater 
heterogeneity emerged within self-employment, especially between private entrepreneurs and the 
unskilled individually self-employed.  
The growing heterogeneity within the private sector was reflected in changes in the 
official classification scheme. When the central government first legalized self-employment 
activities in 1981, it only gave permission to “getihu”—literally, individual industrial and 
commercial households—and restricted them to hiring no more than seven employees; but in 
1988, it became necessary for the government to also legalize larger private enterprises and 
officially classify their owners as “siying yezhu” (私营业主, private owner/entrepreneurs).13 
Figure 1 shows the growth of both getihu and private-firm employees in China’s urban labour 
force from 1978 to 2008, as reported in the official Statistical Yearbooks. The Yearbooks did not 
report numbers of private entrepreneurs, but, starting in 1990, reported numbers of persons 
employed in private enterprises. When it was first reported in 1990, the number of private-firm 
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employees nation-wide was merely 570,000, or 0.4 per cent of the urban labour force. But by 
1996, it had grown more than 10-fold to 6.2 millions, or 3.1 per cent of the urban labour force.  
[INSERT HERE: Figure 1. Growth of Self-Employment, 1978-2008.] 
A second change to the urban employment structure was the decline of the redistributive 
sector (including state and collective firms and institutions), which had dominated wage 
employment in urban China before the 1990s. Urged by Deng Xiaoping in his southern tour 
earlier that year, the CCP, in its 14th Party Congress convened in October 1992, announced the 
goal of establishing a “Socialist market economy” and accelerated reforms in the stagnant state 
sector.14 A series of reform measures gave SOE managers greater authority to dismiss blue-collar 
workers and introduced more market mechanisms into hiring and firing of urban employees.15 
This opened the floodgate of state-sector layoffs that, in the following decade, trimmed the state-
sector labour force by one third and drove tens of millions of former SOE workers into 
unemployment.16 Many of these laid-off workers, having received little relief from the state-
sponsored re-employment programs, resorted to self-employment as a refuge from poverty.17  
Figure 1 also provides at least prima facie evidence to demonstrate the impact of state-
sector lay-off on the growth of self-employment in urban China. From 1985 to 1991, the number 
of getihu in Chinese cities grew from 4.5 millions to 6.9 millions, a 53 per cent growth over 
seven years; but in the period from 1992 to 1999, during which the state-sector lay-off unfolded, 
the number of self-employed grew from 7.4 millions to 24.1 millions, a 226 per cent growth over 
eight years. Starting in 2000, when state-sector lay-off subsided, the number of self-employed 
actually declined and did not surpass the 1999 level until 2004. 
These two processes, which should drive different types of people—men and women, in 
particular—into different positions in self-employment, were precisely what the sociological 
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literature on self-employment theorized as the two mechanisms that motivate people’s entry into 
self-employment.18 The class mobility thesis sees entry into self-employment as people’s choice 
to redeem their special qualities and pursue career advancement, just as former cadres in urban 
China jumped into self-employment to seek greater financial wealth. On the other hand, the 
disadvantaged workers thesis posits that it is disadvantages that restrict people’s options in wage 
employment that drive them into self-employment, just as laid-off workers in urban China turned 
to street peddling as a refuge from poverty.  
These two changes that started in urban China in the early 1990s unfolded over the next 
decade and continued to be the dominant forces transforming the employment structure in urban 
China. As Figure 1 shows, growth of the self-employed population in urban China during the 
2000s has been incremental, and the majority of the self-employed entered during the 1990s. 
Findings based on the 1996 data should be representative for at least the entire decade of 1990s, 
when growth in self-employment was mainly driven by these two processes. In recent years, new 
changes such as the growth of Internet commerce may have created new opportunities for career 
advancement in self-employment, while new structural constraints—such as the growing 
unemployment of college graduates—may have made people turn to self-employment as a last 
resort. While these recent developments would bring new entrants and create new positions in 
self-employment, they are variations of the same two mechanisms that drive the growth of self-
employment. Given that the occupational and demographic structures of this sector were laid 
during the 1990s, these new developments would only introduce changes on the margin. 
Findings on the formation of gender disparities in self-employment during the 1990s, although 
no longer an accurate documentation of details today, should still be relevant in capturing the 
broad contours and illustrating the socio-historical processes that shaped the current situations. 
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Disaggregating Self-Employment in Urban China 
The 1996 LHSC survey drew rural and urban samples separately. This study only uses 
the urban sample of 3,087 persons—which include both permanent residents with household 
registration and registered migrants—drawn from 50 cities nationwide. The survey asked 
respondents to identify all spells of employment. Only limited information, however, was 
collected retrospectively on previous job spells. Key information on self-employment, such as 
earnings and labour-hiring practices, was only available for self-employment on-going at the 
time of survey. Thus, instead of examining the dynamic processes of transitioning into self-
employment, this paper only studies gender differences among those who were self-employed in 
1996. Here, a respondent is coded “self-employed” when one’s main source of income is either 
“head of enterprise or individual entrepreneur” or “independently employed.” The percentage of 
the self-employed in the urban labour force in 1996 is 15.9 with this method.  
I conceptually differentiate three occupational classes within self-employment along two 
dimensions: relation to means of production and authority and relation to scarce skills.19 In terms 
of relations to means of production and to authority, the key difference within the self-employed 
is whether one hires labour or not. For those who do, their appropriation of employees’ labour 
products and domination over employees in the labour process trump the secondary differences 
in skill assets among them. Thus, they are all put in the “small employers” class. In data analysis, 
we have to somewhat arbitrarily draw a line between the two conceptual categories of small 
employers in self-employment and bigger employers in the capitalist class. In this study, I limit 
small employers to those who hired any non-family employees or more than one family member, 
but no more than ten workers in total, regardless of their trade.20 In the 1996 sample, only ten 
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entrepreneurs hired more than ten workers, who were thus excluded;21 for the rest of small 
employers, the average number of non-family employees is 1.6.  
For the non-labour-hiring individually self-employed, differences in skill assets become 
more consequential. They consist of the highly skilled and credentialed professional self-
employed, the traditional petty bourgeoisie in skilled and crafts production, and the unskilled 
self-employed distributed, differing in their skill levels. I differentiate the individually self-
employed into two occupational classes: skilled individually self-employed (SISE) and unskilled 
individually self-employed (UISE).22 The individually self-employed cases are coded into these 
two classes on the basis of their four-digit occupational codes. Self-employment that only 
involves processing customer-supplied materials with some skills but requires little formal 
training and little capital, such as butchers, tailors, shoe repairmen, and other street vendors, and 
occupations in personal services, such as barbers and maids, are coded UISE. Occupations that 
require higher level of skills obtained through formal training and greater amount of means of 
production, such as medical practitioners, insurance or securities salespersons, and electrical or 
mechanical technicians, are coded as SISE. Of the 396 respondents who were self-employed at 
the time of survey, this coding method yields 118 small employers, 99 SISE and 179 UISE. 
  
Gender Gap in Self-Employment Earnings 
I first investigate whether men and women got unequal earnings from self-employment in 
urban China. I use the annual total household business income to measure self-employment 
earnings.23 There are 47 cases that did not report household business income and are thus 
excluded from the analysis.24 This reduces the self-employed sample to 349 cases, consisting of 
109 employers, 86 SISE, and 154 UISE. 
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[INSERT HERE: Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Self-Employed Sample.] 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics that compare men and women in this self-employed 
sample. Women constitute 40 per cent of the sample, and their average self-employment earning 
was only 42 per cent of men’s—8,318 yuan compared to 19,773 yuan. For a comparison, I 
calculated the average wages of the wage-employment sample in the dataset: 6,882 yuan for men 
and 5,117 yuan for women, much lower than the average self-employment earnings. The gender 
gap in wage earnings, however, was much smaller: women’s average wage was 74 per cent of 
men’s. Clearly, although self-employment provided higher financial returns than wage 
employment to some people, it also led to greater gender income disparities. 
Gender segregation—concentration of women in female-typical and devalued jobs, such 
as domestic care and street peddling, in a segmented labour markets—is one of the most 
important causes of gender income inequality and has been documented at every level of 
economic organization, including self-employment.25 In developed economies, gender 
segregation was found to be a universal and resilient feature in self-employment.26 Gender 
segregation, however, only becomes visible when self-employment is disaggregated into 
multiple class positions. Therefore, without a disaggregated approach, the link between gender 
segregation and gender gap in earnings in self-employment in urban China has never been 
examined before.  
The last three rows in Table 1 present the average earnings, by gender, in the three types 
of self-employment. For both genders, earning differences between UISE and SISE were small 
(and statistically non-significant); small employers, however, had significantly higher earnings, 
not surprising given their larger scales of operation and control over employees’ labour surplus. 
Earning differences between the three positions mean that, if men and women were placed 
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unevenly across the three positions, such segregation would contribute to the gender gap in self-
employment earnings. 
[INSERT HERE: Table 2. Distribution in Three Occupational Classes.] 
To measure the extent of gender occupational segregation in the self-employed sample, 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the men and women across the three occupational classes.27 
The uneven distribution of men and women are clear. Fifty-four per cent of all self-employed 
women were concentrated in UISE, whereas self-employed men were roughly equally spread in 
three classes. Except for UISE, where numbers of men and women were roughly even (92 to 87), 
both SISE and small employer—the socioeconomically more rewarding positions—were heavily 
male-dominated, where the men-to-women ratio was 2.1 and 1.8, respectively.28  
Based on the 1996 sample, was there a greater degree of gender segregation in self-
employment than in wage employment in urban China? Index of gender dissimilarity is the most 
widely used measure of gender segregation, and has a value ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 
indicating no gender segregation and 100 indicating complete segregation. Substantively, the 
value of the index is the percentage of either gender that would have to move to a category in 
which the other gender dominates for each gender’s proportional distribution in all categories to 
be the same. The index of dissimilarity across the three classes for the sample of 396 self-
employed cases is 33.9. To compare this across institutional boundary with the index in wage 
employment is, however, tricky. The index is sensitive to the number of categories and how 
categories are divided, both of which can differ in wage employment from self-employment. For 
a tentative comparison that helps to put gender segregation in self-employment in perspective, I 
calculated the index of dissimilarity in the urban wage-employment sample across three 
sectors—state, collective and private. The result is 12.7, suggesting that gender segregation 
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across the three self-employment classes was much more severe than that across the three sectors 
in wage employment.29  
Gender segregation can be investigated at different levels. Besides segregation across the 
three occupational classes, within each class men and women can be further segregated into 
different types of activities; for example, among the similar number of men and women in UISE, 
they could still be highly segregated by industry—men in physical labour such as construction, 
while women in personal services. The dataset, however, does not offer enough information for 
examining segregation within the three categories. Furthermore, segregation across the three 
class positions is probably the most consequential to income inequality.  
Did gender segregation found here contribute to the observed gender gap in earnings? I 
use ordinary least square (OLS) regression to examine the effects of gender segregation on self-
employment earnings. Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from two nested models. Since the 
dependent variable is the natural log of annual household business income, transforming the 
coefficient of an independent variable by 100 x ( e b -1) yields the percentage change in self-
employment earnings caused by one unit change in that independent variable. 
[INSERT HERE: Table 3. Coefficients from OLS Regressions.] 
In Model 1, we find a significant gender effect: Other things equal, self-employed women 
had 20 per cent less earnings than self-employed men. Age also decreases earnings: one 
additional year reduces earning by about one per cent. Education, on the other hand, has a 
significant positive effect: one additional year of schooling increases earning by 6.6 per cent. 
Having a cadre in the household and having a self-employed spouse are non-significant. On the 
other hand, marriage significantly reduces earning by 28 per cent, and the number of under-18 
children in the household has a significant positive effect—each additional child increases 
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earning by 20 per cent. Children’s positive effect may come from parents’ use of their casual 
labour in self-employment activities. Finally, other things controlled, the self-employed in 
Beijing, Tianjin or Shanghai had 67 per cent higher earning than elsewhere.  
Can occupational segregation explain away the gender effect on earnings observed in 
Model 1? I add two dummy variables measuring one’s placement in the three occupational 
classes (UISE is the reference category) in Model 2 while keeping all other variables in Model 1. 
This changed two coefficients: both marriage and gender are no longer statistically significant. 
The employer dummy shows a highly significant effect: small employers, other things equal, had 
income twice as high as the UISE. SISE has a positive but non-significant effect. Together, 
evidences in Model 2 suggest that when differential placements of men and women in self-
employment—i.e., women’s under-representation among employers and SISE—are controlled, 
self-employed women in urban China did not have significantly lower earnings than their male 
counterparts in similar positions. Gender segregation was the main cause of gender income 
inequality in self-employment in urban China.30 
This conclusion seems to contradict the data in Table 1, which shows significant gender 
income gaps within all three occupational classes. The comparison between men’s and women’s 
earnings in Table 1, however, is not a controlled comparison; therefore, the gender earning gaps 
there actually reflect the effects of other personal characteristics such as age and education on 
earnings. What Table 1 does show is that self-employed men and women in the same 
occupational class came from different backgrounds—an issue we turn to next. 
 
Gendered Mobility Processes into Self-Employment 
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What gave rise to the severe gender segregation in self-employment found above? Why 
were women in urban China less successful than men in becoming employers or entering SISE? 
Given that there was no employer discrimination in self-employment that restricted women’s 
entry into certain occupations, gender segregation here was primarily formed through differential 
mobility processes that put men and women with different backgrounds and personal 
characteristics into different positions.  
Sociological research has identified three groups of factors that create gendered pathways 
into self-employment.31 First, men and women can have different personal characteristics, 
especially in their possession of entrepreneurial resources such as human capital, social networks, 
and financial resources, which make the viability and profitability of self-employment different 
for them. Second, men and women face different constraints in wage employment; gender 
discrimination often drives women into self-employment but not men. Third, different gender 
roles within the family can make men and women approach self-employment differently. 
Applying these insights—especially the latter two—to China during the market transition can 
help explain how the two major changes discussed earlier affected men and women’s entry into 
self-employment differently and led to gender segregation.  
First, although growth of the market economy brought new opportunities of financial 
wealth and career advancement in self-employment and private entrepreneurship, these 
opportunities might not be equally accessible to men and women, because of the rising role of 
traditional family norms in determining household division of labour and allocation of resources. 
In China, petty-commodity production, the starting point for most private enterprises, historically 
had been organized within the patriarchal family and kinship structure—as “patricorporations”—
and dominated by men.32 Entrepreneurial self-employment in contemporary China still usually 
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took the form of family business, in which the patriarchal family tradition regulated gender roles: 
tapping on the unpaid female labour in the family but reserving entrepreneurial opportunities for 
men.33 Research on occupational gender segregation in developed countries also found that when 
the economic returns and social status of a job change, its position in the gender-segregated 
employment structure also shifts and men may colonize it and squeeze out women.34 In a 
pioneering study of self-employment in urban China, Davis also suggested that “self-
employment may … emerge as a male prerogative and the tradition of patrimonial, patriarchal 
family corporatism may play a decisive role in the occupational trajectories of urban adults.”35 
Therefore, the privileged allocation of entrepreneurial opportunities within family businesses to 
men could be a cause that gave rise to the under-representation of women in small employers.  
Similarly, the decline of the state sector could also create greater constraints for women 
in wage employment and therefore push more of them into self-employment. Many studies 
documented how the decline of the state sector during the 1990s hit women particularly hard for 
a host of reasons: for example, women concentrated in low-end manufacturing firms, such as 
textile factories, which were the worst hit by the decline; women had accumulated lower human 
capital and occupied lower positions in work units; and the male-dominated management also 
placed lower value on female labour.36 Women not only were laid-off at much higher rates, they 
also had longer durations of unemployment after the layoff and suffered greater wage losses 
when re-employed, as they faced greater employer discrimination in hiring, received less 
government assistance, and had less access to social networks.37 Once laid off, workers faced 
bleak prospects in getting new wage jobs. The declining state sector certainly offered no relief; 
even in the expanding private sector, more jobs were available for rural migrants and the highly 
educated than for the mainly middle-aged, under-educated, and unskilled laid-off workers.38 
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Without any sort of proper social welfare net to fall on, many laid-off workers unable to find new 
wage jobs had to go on the streets—some to engage in self-employment activities, others to 
protest.39 Therefore, the greater difficulties women faced in retaining wage employment during 
state-sector layoffs would drive more low-skilled women into UISE, creating gender segregation.  
To systematically test the validity of these two explanations requires complex statistical 
analyses that are beyond the scope of this study.40 Here, I use a simpler analysis—multinomial 
logistic regression—to generate some preliminary evidence and to identify personal attributes 
that contribute to the formation of gender segregation in self-employment. For this analysis, only 
respondents who were in labour force in 1996—and thus “eligible” of becoming self-
employed—are included (n = 2,560). I run the same multinomial logistic model separately on the 
male sample (n = 1,276) and female sample (n = 1,284) to illustrate gender differences.  
I include five groups of variables. Three variables measure family structure: married, a 
dummy variable, and two continuous variables—number of working adults and number of 
dependents (including non-working children, adults and the elderly). Family background is 
measured with two dummy variables: self-employed parent and pre-Revolution bourgeois family 
are coded 1, respectively, when at least one parent of the respondent had been self-employed at 
one point, or if one parent or grandparent had been a business owner before 1949. The level of 
marketization is calculated from the percentage of cases sampled from a respondent’s city of 
residence that were employed in the private sector, including self-employment and employment 
in cooperative, private, and foreign enterprises. It ranges from zero to 74 among the 50 cities in 
the sample. Two variables, number of job changes and rural origin—a dummy indicating 
whether a respondent had rural household registration at age 14—measure job history. Three 
human capital variables are added as control variables: age and two dummy variables of 
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education level—medium education and higher education—indicating whether a respondent 
completed lower middle school or at least upper middle school, respectively. 
[INSERT HERE: Table 4. Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Models.] 
Table 4 presents coefficients from two multinomial logistic models. (For the sake of 
brevity, standard errors are not presented.) First, there are notable gender differences in the 
family structure variables. Marriage surprisingly had strong positive effects on men’s likelihoods 
of being in all three types of self-employment, but only a significant effect on women’s 
likelihood of becoming employers. This contradicts a consistent finding in developed countries 
where marriage had significant effects on women’s entry into self-employment but not men’s.41 
The effects of marriage on men in urban China offer some support to the argument that 
household division of labour reserved the riskier but potentially more rewarding market 
opportunities for husbands, while assigning wives to the more stable and family-friendly state 
sector, creating gender segregation. This strategy of “one family, two systems” (yijia liangzhi, 一
家两制) allowed families to balance risks and opportunities in urban China’s transitional context. 
In other words, marriage, and especially having wives employed in the state sector, reduced risks 
of market activities and emboldened men’s venture into self-employment.42 Marriage’s effect on 
women’s likelihood of becoming employers probably shows that when entrepreneurial activities 
reached a larger scale, they became family-run businesses, in which women either joined their 
husbands in managing them or needed the participation of their husbands. 
The number of dependents consistently shows non-significant effects on either men or 
women.43 Although again differing from findings in developed countries where family burden 
increased women’s chances of entering self-employment, this finding still reflects the effects of 
gender roles in the family in China’s context. By the mid-1990s, state-sector restructuring had 
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greatly reduced the employer-provided care services, while efforts to marketize these services 
had not been successful.44 Full-time wage employment in state and collective sectors still 
provided a more family-friendly environment for women. The number of working adults in the 
family shows significant positive effects, which are more extensive and stronger for women than 
men. This probably shows women’s greater aversion to market risks than men: having more 
family members in gainful employment and providing both greater financial resources and 
access to employer-based social services decreased risks of self-employment for women.45 
Second, the two measures of family background show stronger and more consistent 
effects on men than on women. Both variables significantly increased the likelihoods of 
becoming employers for both men and women. But they also had male-specific effects: having a 
self-employed parent significantly increased men’s likelihoods of being in SISE (more than 
doubled), and coming from a pre-Revolution bourgeois family significantly increased men’s 
chances of being in UISE by 66 per cent. These evidences show strong intergenerational 
transmission of self-employment status, a pattern not noticed in past research. The gender 
differences also suggest that this intergenerational transmission—more likely through job values 
than through direct inheritance in China—is also a gendered process.  
Third, the two career history variables show the sharpest gender contrasts. While neither 
had any significant effects on men, having more job changes and coming from a rural origin both 
significantly increased women’s odds of being in all three types of self-employment. Past 
research showed that, in urban China, women’s job changes were usually motivated by family 
considerations and led to downward mobility.46 Thus, both more frequent job changes and rural 
origin were indications of disadvantages in wage employment, especially in the state sector, 
which made one more vulnerable to layoffs. Their positive effects on women support the 
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argument that more women were pushed into self-employment by the disadvantages they faced 
in wage employment, especially during the state-sector layoffs.  
Finally, men and women also responded to changing economic context in different ways. 
A higher level of marketization in the city of residence was associated with significantly higher 
likelihoods of men entering all types of self-employment, but only had a significant effect in 
increasing women’s odds of being employers.  
 
Conclusion 
Three problems in the existing literature on self-employment in urban China motivated 
this research. First, due to lack of quantitative data, no study had investigated the unequal 
economic returns that existed within self-employment in urban China and, more specifically, the 
unequal earnings from self-employment between men and women. Second, previous studies 
failed to explicitly disaggregate heterogeneous occupational classes within self-employment and, 
as result, were unable to uncover the existence of gender occupational segregation in self-
employment or to examine the link between occupational segregation and gender gap in earnings. 
Third, no study had yet systematically investigated a wide range of factors that shaped the 
gender-specific pathways into self-employment in urban China and gave rise to occupational 
segregation and unequal earnings. 
Empirical analyses in this paper yielded some preliminary findings in each of these three 
areas. Gender segregation became apparent when self-employment was disaggregated into three 
occupational classes. Women were concentrated in the least rewarding UISE while men 
dominated the more rewarding SISE and employer categories. As a result, men and women 
derived significantly different earnings from self-employment. Gender segregation in self-
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employment was formed when labour market processes and family division of labour presented 
different constraints and incentives to men and women and led them onto different pathways into 
self-employment. The two major social changes that took place during the 1990s to urban 
China’s employment structure—growth of financial return and social status in private sector and 
restructuring of the state sector—both exacerbated gender segregation in self-employment: men 
had advantages in taking entrepreneurial opportunities in family businesses, while women were 
disproportionately affected by state-sector layoffs and pushed into low-end self-employment.  
These findings echo those in previous studies about the high degree of gender segregation 
and gender income inequality in urban China’s private sector. These evidences suggest that once 
the state retreated from protecting gender equality at work, promoting progressive gender 
relations in the family, and providing affordable care services to alleviate women’s domestic 
responsibilities, market forces, aided by revitalized traditional family norms, led to greater 
gender disparities in employment.  
Gender segregation in self-employment—and, in turn, the gender gap in earnings—could 
potentially decline in urban China in more recent years, if a new set of mobility processes started 
to bring more women with greater entrepreneurial resources into the more rewarding positions in 
self-employment. There are, however, strong reasons to believe that persistent and even 
increased gender segregation is much more likely. First, without institutional reforms aimed at 
reducing it, gender segregation tends to reproduce itself.47 In urban China’s case, the 
feminization of UISE and male dominance in private entrepreneurship would attach social 
stigma to the former and prestige to the latter, making the entry by the minority gender into each 
even more difficult than before. Second, the internal mobility in self-employment in urban China 
was more likely to reinforce rather than reduce gender segregation. Many women in UISE were 
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low-skill workers pushed into self-employment by state-sector layoffs; their prospects of gaining 
upward mobility into SISE or small employers were low. The more resourceful men who entered 
private entrepreneurship to pursue career advancements, on the other hand, would probably 
enjoy greater upward mobility. Third, there was no indication that the gendered mobility 
processes that led differentially qualified men and women into different positions in self-
employment reversed in recent years. In fact, as social welfare and care provision became 
increasing tied to professional wage employment in both the state and private sectors while self-
employment continued to offer little, educated women would probably become even more 
reluctant to enter self-employment, where they would face intensified work-family conflicts. As 
a result, the structure of gender disparities in self-employment in urban China formed during the 
sector’s formative period in the 1990s, as documented here, would most likely persist. 
One development that can have a real impact on the structure of inequality in urban self-
employment is the huge influx of rural migrants in the past decade, driven by both the decline of 
township-and-village enterprises and nonfarm employment in rural areas and the relaxation of 
the household registration in cities. How migrant men and women entered urban self-
employment differently is a question that calls for future research.     
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Figure 1. Growth of Self-Employment and Employment in Private Enterprises in Urban China, 1978-2008.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Self-Employed Sample, by Gender. 
 Men (n = 211) Women (n = 138)  
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
F-test 
Self-employment earnings (yuan) 19773 50459 8318 16429 3.33* 
Age  39.4 12.0 38.9 12.8   .09 
Years of schooling 8.3 3.1 7.6 3.8 1.88 
Years in self-employment 7.1 6.3 6.6 7.2   .19 
Number of under-18 children in family .91 .85 .71 .83 2.79* 
Having a cadre in household .02 .15 .07 .26 3.34* 
Married .83 .38 .76 .43 1.19 
      
Earnings by self-employment class (yuan)      
UISE 8605 17679 5458 3925 1.27 
SISE 9054 9256 4199 2616 3.71* 
Small employer 32309 17679 23132 35866   .19 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed test).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the Self-Employed in Three Occupational Classes, by Gender. 
 Men Women  
 Count  % of men  Count  % of women Total 
UISE 92 39.1 87 54.0 179 
SISE 67 28.5 32 19.9 99 
Small employer 76 32.3 42 26.1 118 
Total 235 100 161 100 396 
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Table 3. Coefficients from OLS Regressions of Self-Employment Earnings (Ln).  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B Std. Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Intercept 8.77*** .30  8.46*** .29 
Individual characteristics:     
Female -.23** .11     -.17 .10 
Age      -.01* .01 -.01** .01 
Education: Years of schooling     .06*** .02    .06*** .02 
     
Household characteristics:     
Married -.33* .19 -.28 .18 
Number of under-18 children in family      .18*** .07     .18***      .06 
Cadre household .22 .33 .04 .31 
Self-employed spouse .18 .11 .13 .11 
     
Control variables:      
Years in self-employment .00 .01 .01 .01 
Residence in a municipality        .51*** .15      .49*** .14 
     
Self-employment position:     
SISE ------ ------ .13 .13 
Employer ------ ------       .69*** .12 
     
Observations  349 349 
R2 .16 .25 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed test).  
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Table 4. Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Models of Entry into Three Types of Self-Employment, Gender Stratified. 
 Men  Women 
  UISE SISE Employer  UISE SISE Employer 
Intercept -3.50***    -4.35*** -3.41***  -2.56*** -6.24*** -4.29*** 
Human capital:         
Age         .00 -.01 -.03**  -.03* .01 -.05*** 
Medium education -.47* .14 -.68**       -.32 .51      -.59 
High education  -1.66*** -.58 -.67**     -1.67*** .14 -1.36*** 
Family structure:         
Married .91**   1.44** .65*  .23 .50 1.09* 
Number of dependents       .07 .04        .02       -.17 -.15       -.13 
Number of working adults      -.07        -.18    .28**       .39*** .28     .58*** 
Family background:        
Parent self-employed        .50    1.22***   1.07***        -.07 .92      1.02* 
Pre-revolution bourgeois family .51* .37   .65**  -.10 -.19    .83** 
Career history:         
Job changes       -.10 .09 .05       .19** .18*     .33*** 
Rural origin .19 .23 .32         .76***  1.14***    .77** 
Level of marketization      .04***      .03***    .04***    .01 .01  .02* 
        
Observations   1276    1284  
-2 log-likelihood       1556***          1173***  
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed test).  
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